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I. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Claimant Sohar Chavez was injured on September 8, 2012, when his left pinky finger got 
caught in a motorized chain on some wheel lines he was moving. Local EMT personnel 
responded with an ambulance, and Claimant was life-flighted from the scene of the accident,just 
outside Payette, Idaho, to St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center in Boise, Idaho. At St. 
Alphonsus, the amputation was completed. Claimant recovered from the injury and the treatment 
he received uneventfully. 
Claimant filed a Complaint on October 10, 2012. Defendant Employer, Kevin Stokes, 
initially responded through counsel with the filing of an Answer on November 5, 2012, denying 
that Claimant was an employee. An Amended Answer with new counsel was filed by Defendant 
Employer on December 17, 2012, admitting that Claimant was an employee. Defendant 
Employer Stokes paid for all of Claimant's temporary disability and paid for his impairment. He 
also paid for all the medical expenses Claimant incurred with the exception of the Life Flight 
Network bill, which was $21,201.00. 
On September 3, 2014, the Industrial Commission issued a Notice of Intent to Dismiss. 
On September 6, 2014, Claimant's counsel filed a Request for Calendaring on the only issue that 
remained, which was the reasonableness of the Life Flight Network service under Idaho Code § 
72-432. The matter was calendared to be heard on October 30, 2013, at which time a hearing was 
conducted by Referee Michael E. Powers. Exhibits were offered and admitted at hearing, and 
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testimony was taken from Defendant Employer Kevin Stokes. At the conclusion of the hearing, 
both parties and the Referee decided that briefing was not necessary. 
Referee Powers submitted his Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Recommendation on March 10, 2014. The Referee concluded in his proposed decision that he 
was "unable to find in the record as submitted any evidence that it was reasonable or necessary 
to life-flight Claimant from near Fruitland to Boise based upon an apparent misconception that 
Claimant's small fingertip could be salvaged." He went on to note that "there is no evidence that 
such could not have been accomplished at Holy Rosary or that arrangements could not have been 
made to transfer him to St. Alphonsus." (Agency Record, p. 13). 
The Industrial Commission chose to not adopt the Referee's proposed decision, and by 
letter dated April 7, 2014, requested briefing on whether a finding that the Life Flight Network 
care was not reasonable would leave Claimant exposed to a civil action for collection of the bill. 
(Agency Record, p. 15). The parties then submitted briefing, and the Industrial Commission 
issued its decision on September 26, 2014. In that decision the Industrial Commission concluded 
that treatment in the form of life-flighting Claimant from outside Payette to St. Alphonsus 
Regional Medical Center in Boise was reasonable under Idaho Code § 72-432 and under the 
decision of Sprague v. Caldwell Transportation, Inc., 116 Idaho 720, 722, 779 P.2d 395, 397 
(1989). Defendant Employer timely filed an appeal of the Industrial Commission decision. 
A. FACTS OF CASE: 
Defendant Employer Kevin Stokes is a farmer in Fruitland. (HT, p. 17, 11. 8-22). He hired 
Sohar Chavez, the claimant in this case, to help him with irrigation in April of 2012. (HT, p. 18, 
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11. 6-14). On the day of the accident Defendant Employer Stokes got a phone call from Payette 
County Dispatch advising him that Claimant had been injured and where he was. (HT, p. 19, 11. 
21-24). He went to the scene of the accident, at which time he found three Payette County 
paramedics, a Sheriffs deputy, and Defendant's uncle. Claimant was there as well. (HT, p. 20, 11. 
1 - 6). Claimant had obviously received first aid evidenced by the fact he was holding his hand 
up in the air elevated and it was bandaged. (HT, p. 20, 11. 9-12). Defendant Stokes immediately 
inquired as to what was going to happen next, and did not get an answer from any of the 
personnel there. (HT, p. 20, 11. 15-19). He initiated the inquiry, because the ambulance was there 
and he couldn't figure out why they weren't taking Claimant to the hospital. (HT, p. 20, 1. 22 - p. 
21, 1 ). That was when he found out that a helicopter was going to show up, and he asked them 
why that was necessary. (HT, p.21, 11. 1 - 15). Defendant Stokes did not believe that bringing 
Life Flight Network into the equation was reasonable and expressed these concerns to the 
personnel on the scene. They did not respond to his inquiries in this regard. (HT, p. 21, 11. 8-20). 
After the incident, Defendant Stokes drove the distance between the accident scene and 
Holy Rosary Hospital in Ontario, Oregon, 3 times at different times of the day. It took 15 
minutes at the longest, and 12 minutes at the shortest. (HT, p. 22, 11. 4 - 8). The distance between 
the accident scene and the ER door of Holy Rosary in Ontario turned out to be 9.8 miles. (HT, p. 
22, 11. 20-21 ). After Defendant Stokes showed up, it was at least 10 minutes until the helicopter 
showed up. (HT, p. 22, 1. 25 - p. 23, 1. 1). Defendant Stokes has lived in the Fruitland area most 
of his life. He is aware that there are several orthopedic surgeons in the vicinity. (HT, p. 24, 11. 1-
7). 
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Later on in the evening Defendant Stokes received a phone call from Claimant at St. 
Alphonsus Regional Medical Center in Boise. Defendant Stokes drove over to Boise, picked 
Claimant up, and took him home. During the drive home, Claimant asked him why he was flown 
to Boise -- that is to say, he did not know why he was flown to Boise. (HT, p. 27, 11. 5-10). 
Exhibits include the Form 1, which documents that the accident occurred on September 
8, 2012, at 5:00 p.m. The Form 1 establishes that Claimant was moving irrigation lines when his 
left hand got caught up in the chain of a motor. (Defendant's Ex. 1). Payette Paramedic records 
establish that they responded to the incident on September 8, 2012, and that when they arrived, a 
language barrier prohibited them from learning how the injury had occurred or other "subjective 
information." These records document that some off-duty Payette County paramedic EMT 
telephoned in to "Medic 20." (Defendant's Ex. 2). As pointed out in the Commission's decision, 
we do not know who or what "Medic 20" is. (Agency Record, p. 48, footnote 3). The paramedic 
records document that some unidentified person requested Life Flight Network service 
(Defendant's Ex. 2). These records do not document what, if any, conversation they had with 
Claimant as to what his desires were for treatment. Keep in mind, Defendant Stokes was there 
for at least 10 minutes before the helicopter arrived and could have aided in the conversation 
with Claimant as to what his desires were had anyone made the attempt. 
Life Flight Network records document that a request came in from Payette County EMTs 
for a 41-year-old man who sustained an amputation of his pinky finger. (Defendant's Ex. 3). 
These records do not establish any sort of a protocol for some sort of a triage review, which 
clearly should have occurred in order to determine whether using an asset that valuable and 
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expensive was appropriate. The records do not establish any sort of critical situation or 
emergency that sought to be addressed by transporting Claimant to the hospital in this fashion at 
this point in time. 
Records from St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center start with a September 8, 2012, 
Emergency Department report authored by Dr. Elliott, who quickly concluded that the pinky 
finger was likely nonviable. He brought in Dr. Clawson to consult on definitive treatment. Dr. 
Clawson authored an Emergency Department Consultation the same date, September 8, 2012, 
noting an incomplete amputation of the left small finger at two levels. He reviewed x-rays and 
concluded that the finger was not salvageable. He then proceeded to complete the amputation 
and repair the stump. (Defendant's Ex. 4). 
Dr. Clawson saw Claimant in followup on December 27, 2012, and observed that the 
stump was well healed. He concluded that Claimant was medically stable and had suffered a 
95% small finger impairment, which he noted corresponded to a 10% hand impairment, or 9% 
upper extremity impairment. He did not recommend any restrictions or followup care for 
Claimant. (Defendant's Ex. 5). 
Defendant had the matter reviewed by Dr. Paul Collins, an orthopedic surgeon, who 
concluded that the injury sustained by Claimant was "not in any way, shape or form life critical." 
He pointed out that Claimant should have been taken to Holy Rosary in Ontario and worked up, 
and that if it turned out for some reason he needed to be taken to Boise for vascular 
reconstruction, there still would have been plenty of time to get that done. (Defendant's Ex. 6). 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 5 
II. 
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Whether life-flighting Claimant from the scene of the accident outside of Payette to St. 
Alphonsus Regional Medical Center in Boise, Idaho for partial amputation of a pinky finger was 




A. There is No Evidence in the Medical Record which Supports the Notion that 
Transporting Claimant to St Alphonsus in Boise was reasonable 
Idaho Code § 72-432 defines the parameters of an employer's responsibility for medical 
treatment of an injured worker. Subsection (1) of the statute requires the employer to provide, 
"reasonable medical" ... "as may be reasonably required by the employee's physician," or, 
"needed immediately after an injury" ... "and for a reasonable time thereafter." Idaho Code § 
72-432(1 )( emphasis added). In this matter, there exists no dispute as to the facts in the record. 
Claimant sustained crush injuries to his pinky finger. Emergency medical personnel responded. 
They provided first aid at the scene of the accident. What is not clear from the record is how the 
decision was made, by whom the decision was made, or why the decision was made to transport 
Claimant from the Payette area to St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center in Boise. As the 
Industrial Commission's ultimate decision establishes, "The record does not clarify if the 
responders to Claimant's injuries were paramedics or EMTs." (Agency Record, p. 47). The only 
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portion of the record that sheds any light on this series of events states, "Off-duty Payette County 
paramedics EMT landlines Medic 20 and advises finger may be able to be surgically fixed. Life 
Flight Network is requested to launch." (Defendant's Ex. 2). The fact is, there is no evidence that 
anyone in Payette "ordered" Claimant to be life-flighted. The record reflects that a "request" was 
made. 
The fact of the matter is that from this record one cannot glean exactly what happened. 
All one can determine is that there was some conversation apparently initiated by an off duty 
Payette County paramedic. It is clear that a call was put in to Life Flight Network. It is not clear 
whether this was an order for medical care or that they were in a position to order Life Flight 
Network to do anything. In the record it was characterized as an action that was "requested." 
While Defendant Employer was never able to discover exactly how Life Flight Network 
goes about determining whether they will respond, Defendant Employer did attempt to research 
the issue to some extent. Defendant Employer put into evidence a Position Statement put out by 
American College of Emergency Physicians and National Association of EMS Physicians, 
entitled "Guidelines for Air Medical Dispatch Policy Resource and Education Paper." The policy 
paper establishes that in general it is a good idea for Life Flight Network services to establish 
guidelines to determine when they will respond. The paper goes on to outline a number of 
questions that the Life Flight Network service should pose and answer before agreeing to 
respond. Finally, it suggests specific situations are more likely to be appropriate for transport 
than others. As to orthopedic injuries to the extremities, it suggests that finger and thumb 
amputations are only appropriate for helicopter transport when replantation consideration is 
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contemplated and rapid surface transport is not available. (Ex. 10, p. 12). There is nothing in the 
record as to what Life Flight Network protocol was or whether that protocol was followed. We 
do know that rapid surface transport was available, because an ambulance was present. 
In the current instance, Claimant was less than ten (10) miles from Holy Rosary Hospital. 
Driving the speed limit, it would have taken between 12 and 16 minutes to get Claimant from the 
spot at which the helicopter picked him up to Holy Rosary Hospital. Holy Rosary Hospital, 
obviously has an emergency room with medical physicians and all sorts of imaging devices at 
their disposal to examine injuries and make recommendations for medical care. In this particular 
case, there is absolutely no explanation in the record as to why Claimant could not have been 
taken to Holy Rosary and had a medical workup conducted at that facility to determine what 
medical care might be most appropriate, including reattachment. If reattachment were an option, 
the determination as to whether local orthopedic surgeons were up to such a task or whether if 
that decision turned out to be an attempt at reattachment, further determination made there at 
Holy Rosary as to whether local orthopedic surgeons were up to such a task, or whether 
Claimant needed to be life-flighted to Boise in order to explore the same, could have been made 
at Holy Rosary. This was the obvious and the logical course of action to take. Common sense 
tells you as much. 
This is not, however, the analysis that the Industrial Commission decided to employ in 
this case. The Industrial Commission instead cites the case of Sprague v. Caldwell 
Transportation, Inc., 116 Idaho 720, 722, 779 P.2d 395, 397 (1989), in an overly rigid fashion to 
avoid the common sense review of the facts that it should undertake. The Commission cites to 
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the test attributed to Sprague. The test is whether (a) the claimant made gradual improvement 
from the treatment received; (b) the treatment was required by the claimant's physician; and (c) 
the treatment received was within the physician's standard of practice, the charges for which 
were fair, reasonable and similar to charges in the same profession. Hipwell v. Challenger Pallet 
and Supply, 124 Idaho 294, 299, 859 P.2d 330, 335 (1993). Hipwell has been read by the 
Commission as reducing the matter to an examination as to whether the treatment was required 
by the claimant's physician. That is not the standard set out in the statute, and it is not the 
standard industry uses. The treating physician does not get to announce what treatment is 
required only to never be subject to review by anybody. The Court in Sprague quoted Idaho 
Code§ 72-432(1) as follows: 
The employer shall provide for an injured employee such reasonable medical, 
surgical or other attendance or treatment, nurse and hospital service, 
medicines, crutches and apparatus, as may be required by the employee's 
physician, immediately after an injury or disability from an occupational 
disease, and for a reasonable time thereafter. If an employer fails to provide the 
same, the injured employee may do so at the expense of the employer. Sprague 
v. Caldwell Transportation, Inc., 116 Idaho 720, 722, 779 P.2d 395, 397 
( 1989)( emphasis added). 
That is not what the statute says. In pertinent part, the statute reads: 
As may be reasonably required by the employee's physician. Idaho Code §72-
432(1). 
The difference is obvious. Through the erroneous version utilized by the Court in Sprague and 
subsequently relied upon in Hipwell, one can read the statute in a fashion such that there can be 
no review of a treating physician's determination of what is required in the way of medical care. 
However, the statute makes it clear that the treating physician has to be reasonable in his 
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assessment as to what is required. That, of course, makes much more sense. In pretty much all 
areas of the law we require people to act in a reasonable fashion, and we allow for a review as to 
whether their actions and/or their recommendations were reasonable, especially when it comes to 
medical care. Who would want to foster unreasonable medical care? 
In the current instance, the Industrial Commission conceded that it could not identify the 
treating physician in the sense that they could not identify the individual who ultimately had the 
decision making authority to determine if Life Flight Network service was appropriate and to 
order the launch of the helicopter itself. The Commission, in a footnote, speculated that it was 
either an off duty paramedic or Medic 20. The fact of the matter is, there is no medical record 
identifying who has the authority to order Life Flight Network service. We do not even know 
whether either one of these individuals, who the Commission presumed to have medical 
credentials allowing them to rise to the status of a treating physician, actually made the call. It 
could have been "Bertha", a part-time volunteer with no credentials, who actually made the call. 
Similarly, we do not know what transpired on the other end. That is to say, we do not 
know who received the call from Payette. We know a call was made, because ultimately a 
helicopter was launched and managed to find its way to where Claimant was. What we do not 
know is who took the call, nor do we know what kind of a review process was in place with Life 
Flight Network to review the reasonableness or necessity of response, let alone whether that 
process was followed. It seems axiomatic to Defendant that you cannot say the treating physician 
reasonably required the launch of a Life Flight Network helicopter when you cannot even 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF IO 
identify (1) the people who were involved in the process; (2) the people who ultimately decided 
to respond; and (3) the criteria they utilized in making the decision. 
The Industrial Commission then went on to conclude that Claimant improved or 
benefitted in some fashion from the Life Flight Network service by virtue of the fact that when 
he showed up at St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center the amputation was completed and he 
was left with a healthy stump. There is no nexus demonstrated in the record between the life-
flighting of Claimant to St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center in Boise and the ultimate 
outcome or improvement. The outcome would have been the same had he simply been 
transported to Holy Rosary Hospital. 
Ultimately, if we try to apply the test outlined by Sprague to the facts of this case, the 
claim for compensation to the tune of $21,201.00 must fail, because there literally is no factual 
basis to support the Commission's decision. 
The fact that there was no basis to support the Commission's decision was obvious to the 
Referee who actually heard the case. Neither party nor the Referee at the end of the hearing felt 
that briefing would be of any value: 
Referee Powers: Okay. Do you gentlemen want to write briefs? 
Mr. Owen: I'd be repeating basically the same thing I said here today. 
Mr. Bowen: I really don't - would it be of benefit to the Commission? 
Referee Powers: Not in this case I don't think. I think it is clear. 
Mr. Bowen: I don't see the need for it. 
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Referee Powers: I could rule from the bench if I could rule, but I can't so I 
won't. 
(HT, p. 28, 11. 12-22). 
When briefing was ordered by means of Commissioner Baskin's April 7, 2014 letter, 
briefing was not requested on the issue posed by the case, that being whether or not Life Flight 
Network services constituted reasonable care under Idaho Code § 72-432, but, rather, they 
requested briefing as to the following issue: 
If the Commission determines the treatment is unreasonable, thus freeing 
employer from the obligation of paying, is the Claimant exposed to civil action 
for collection of the bill? 
(Agency Record, p. 15). 
In other words, the decision was not based upon the issue posed by the case, nor was the 
decision based upon the facts put before the Commission in order to decide the issue posed by 
the case, but, rather, the case was decided based upon the Industrial Commission's concerns that 
if they found Life Flight Network services unreasonable, Claimant might face potential exposure 
in another forum. That concern has never been the basis for a determination as to what 
constitutes reasonable or unreasonable medical care as envisioned by Idaho Code § 72-432(1 ). 
That concern is based upon mere speculation as to what might happen in the future if the 
Commission finds for the Defendant. Anytime the Industrial Commission finds for a defendant 
on a compensability issue, a claimant faces potential exposure for medical treatment rendered. 
The provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act are to be liberally construed in favor 
of the employee. Holdiman v. American Fine Foods, 117 Idaho 955, 956, 793 P.2d 187, 188 
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(1990). However, the Commission is not required to construe facts liberally in favor of the 
worker when evidence is conflicting. Aldrich v. Lamb-Weston, Inc., 122 Idaho 361, 363, 834 
P.2d 878, 880 (1992). Claimant must provide medical testimony by way of physician's testimony 
or written medical record, which supports a claim for compensation to a reasonable degree of 
medical probability. Langley v. State Industrial Special Indemnity Fund, 126 Idaho 781,785,890 
P.2d 732, 736 (1995). One of the fundamental rules of procedure is that the party seeking 
affirmative relief has the burden of proof. Woodruff v. Butte Mkt, L. C. Co., 64 Idaho 735, 13 7 
P.2d 325 (1943). 
Claimant's counsel requested that there be a hearing on the issue as to whether the Life 
Flight Network services were reasonable under Idaho Code§ 72-432(1). Defendant agreed that it 
was appropriate to have the issue heard. The burden of proof was on Claimant, the party seeking 
relief. A hearing was held, at which time all the medical records involved in the case were put 
before the Industrial Commission in the form of exhibits. Defendant offered, in addition, an 
April 9, 2013 letter authored by orthopedic surgeon Paul C. Collins, M.D., who opined: 
I do not understand why Life Flight was called or addressed in the first place, 
and why the patient was not taken to Holy Rosary. Indeed, it is extremely 
reasonable that the patient would be taken physically to Holy Rosary Hospital. 
Had there been an incident which may in some way benefitted from a vascular 
reconstruction, then the patient could be transferred to St. Alphonsus or St. 
Luke's. Indeed, this was in no way necessary. 
(Hearing Ex. 6, p. 55). 
The facts of the case themselves make it clear that there can be no justification for what 
was done. The injury on a relative scale was minor. A perfectly fine hospital with orthopedic 
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surgeons was 10 to 15 minutes away. There was no critical time element or emergency per the 
opinion of Dr. Collins, or otherwise demonstrated in any of the medical records, which would 
justify flying Claimant to Boise. This was apparent to the employer when he arrived on the scene 
and he posed the question to the emergency personnel in attendance. He wondered why Claimant 
was not being taken to Holy Rosary. Nobody would provide him an answer. 
Claimant was flown to St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center in Boise, where it was 
clear that there was not really any possibility of revascularization of the digit, and the amputation 
was completed. Claimant was then basically stranded 60 miles from home. 
Idaho Code § 72-432(1) is not a difficult statute to understand. It requires the employer to 
provide reasonable medical care to an injured worker. Determining what is reasonable is not 
rocket science -- it is a standard used in pretty much all areas of the law. Here it is quite clear that 
there was absolutely no reason why Claimant was not taken to the local hospital for diagnosis, 
triage, imaging, and where further decisions could be made about his medical care, including the 
need for transport. We do not know who made the decision. We do not know why the decision 
was made, other than a cryptic reference contained in the medical to the effect that the digit 
"may" be subject to revascularization. We do not know who made this observation or what their 
credentials might be to make such an observation. What we do know is that nothing would have 
been lost had they just simply taken Claimant to Holy Rosary, where all these determinations 
could be made by individuals who could have actually inspected the finger and utilized vastly 
superior credentials and equipment to make the decision. Common sense tells us that the life-
flighting of this gentleman to Boise was not reasonable. There is no substantial competent 
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evidence to support the Industrial Commission decision. The decision itself seems to be premised 
upon the notion that once a medical decision has been made, the reasonableness of that decision 
cannot be reviewed. As previously pointed out, the statute clearly indicates otherwise, and the 
record contains no facts to support the decision. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
The Industrial Commission's decision does not pass scrutiny by applying the test that was 
utilized in Sprague. There is no competent substantial evidence in the record to support such a 
finding utilizing Sprague. The Industrial Commission decision does not pass scrutiny by 
applying common sense. The Industrial Commission decision is result oriented based upon 
concerns beyond the purview of the issue posed by the parties. The Industrial Commission was 
concerned about Claimant's potential for exposure in another forum, an issue that it was not 
asked to address. Idaho Code § 72-432 requires that the analysis of the compensability of 
medical care be based upon what is reasonable at the time care is contemplated. Utilizing that 
criteria, it is clear that the life-flighting of Claimant to Boise was not reasonable. Not only was 
nothing gained, but to the alternative, sending him to Holy Rosary to more accurately determine 
the scope of his injuries and need for care was by far the better option and preserved all potential 
remedies, including subsequent life-flighting from Holy Rosary itself to St. Alphonsus. All that 
Life Flight Network service accomplished in this instance was a big bill, tying up otherwise 
limited resources and stranding Claimant 60 miles from his home. 
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In this era of escalating medical costs, it is absolutely critical the public retain some 
ability to scrutinize the delivery of medical care. Part of that scrutiny is clearly the ability to 
review the reasonableness of the care proposed and the care delivered. If we forego such a 
review, rest assured medical costs will explode, and the delivery of medical care will become 
increasingly thoughtless and unreasonable. In this instance, the claim is fairly straightforward, as 
Referee Powers commented upon at the hearing. There are no facts in the record which explain 
how this decision was made, who made the decision, what level of medical expertise they had 
such that they had any business making the decision, or why the alternative, that being ground 
transport to Holy Rosary, was not a better alternative. To the contrary, the only known physician 
who has reviewed the record found no basis upon which he could justify the transportation of 
Claimant to Boise, Idaho for treatment. The Industrial Commission decision should be reversed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ~ay of January, 2015. 
BOWEN &BAILEY, LLP 
RA(bJp~ 
R. DANIEL BOWEN--ofeFinn 
Attorneys for Defendant J3fuployer/ Appellant 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 16 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ~ay of January, 2015, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing document was delivered to the following party(ies) in the method indicated: 
RICHARD S OWEN ESQ 
OWEN &FARNEY 
POBOX278 
NAMPD ID 83653 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
U.S. MAIL 
HAND DELIVERY 
FACSIMILE 
17 
